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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MERWYN L. WILKINSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH; GARRETT FREIGHT-
LINES, INC. and TRUCK INSUR-
ANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
Case 
No. 11814 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a proceeding to review a decision by 
the Industrial Commission of Utah denying plaintiff's 
claim to workmen's compensation benefits. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On or about December 12, 1967, plaintiff filed 
an application for hearing to settle an industrial 
accident claim. A hearing was nela on April 1969, 
1 
before Robert J. Shaughnessey, Hearing Examiner for 
the Industrial Commission. On May 22, 1969, plain-
tiff's claim to compensation was denied in its en-
tirety by the Industrial Commission. Thereafter, on 
June 4, 1969, plaintiff filed with said Commission a 
Motion for Extension of Time to file a Motion for Re-
view of the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Order, and the Commission granted a 
30 days' extension of time from June 9, 1969, in which 
to file Petitioner's Motion for Review. On June 26, 
1969, plaintiff filed his Motion for Review of the 
Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, and said Motion for Review was denied by the 
Commission on August 1, 1969. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PROCEEDING 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Commission's 
decision below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was employed as a truck driver at 
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. He was severely injured 
2 
in an automobile accident which occurred on September 
7, 1967, at about 4:15 p.m. at 50 South Redwood Road 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, directly in front of the 
place of business of plaintiff's employer. Plaintiff 
was attempting to egress from his employer's placr of 
business by making a left turn on to Redwood Road. 
The collision occurred on the inside south-bound lane 
of Redwood Road. 
Plaintiff was a driver on the "extra board" at 
Garrett Freightlines. The "extra board" drivers are 
drivers that have no definite driving times or regu-
lar assignments, but who are called to take extra 
runs when the need arises. When an "extra board" 
driver completes a driving assignment, he signs his 
name at the bottom of the extra board list and is 
called when all the other drivers above him in their 
turn have been called to drive. The record is quite 
clear that although most of the extra drivers receive 
their assignments in the early evening hours and are 
on call thereafter, the extra board drivers are also 
subject to call between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 
3 
4:00 p.m. If a driver is not available when his call 
comes, his name is dropped to the bottom of the list 
and he then is required to wait one complete rotation 
until his name appears again. The record indicates 
as follows: 
Q. Item number 7 on Defendant's 
exhibit No. 3 states the following: 
"Drivers who have not been alerted for 
dispatch shall remain in their position 
on the board, and subject to call for 
dispatch at 7:00 a.m. Drivers not 
available between the hours of 7:00 a.m. 
and 4:00 p.m. shall be dropped to the 
bottom of the board." Does this mean, 
Mr. Stoddard, that although the normal 
course of events, as far as the drivers 
to go out in the evening, that there 
are some men that go out during the day? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. And have to be on call? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Record at 46. 
Plaintiff's sole purpose in being at his em-
player's place of business before the accident was 
to let his employer know that he was available to 
go to work and to ascertain his probable departure 
time that evening. 
4 
Plaintiff testified that he remembers calling 
in to Garrett Freightlines sometime on the day of the 
accident, September 7, 1967. He was told that he 
would likely drive a truck sometime that evening for 
his employer. He testified that since he would not 
be home to receive their call, he would check in 
with Garrett later on in the afternoon, no later than 
5:30 p.m. Record at 56-57. Mr. Christensen, the 
terminal manager, made a notation on the extra board 
sheet to the effect that plaintiff would call in at 
17:30 hours. In accordance with plaintiff's inten-
tions, he did report before 5:30 p.m. and talked to 
the dispatcher personally at or around 4:00 p.m. on 
the afternoon of September 7, 1967: 
Q. Now, if you can reflect back 
on the day of September 7, 1967, can you 
recall having called Garrett Freightlines 
sometime during the day to ascertain your 
relative position on the board, or your 
probable departure time? 
A. Yes, I can remember. 
Q. What can you remember about that? 
I ca11 t!.Lc.1 
they'd be going out that evening that 
5 
I--and I was [not] going to be home 
so I told them that I would check 
back later in the afternoon. 
Q. Did you make any arrange-
ments--first of all, can you remem-
ber whether you made any arrangements 
to report to Garrett Freightlines? 
A. Well, I can't remember any. 
I knew it would be before 5:30 because 
that was usually the time they would 
call you, but I can't remember, no. 
Q. Can you remember with whom 
you spoke earlier in the day by tele-
phone? 
A. No, I can't remember exactly 
who it was. 
Q. You mentioned that there was 
an understanding that you report there 
in person later in the afternoon. 
A. Well, I told them I wasn't 
home and I would probably stop in in 
the afternoon, yes. 
Q. Do you recollect whether any-
one there expressed any disapproval with 
your intention to report personally? 
A. No. Nobody gave me any dis-
approval. No, sir. 
Q. At what time did you actually 
report at Garrett's? Can you remember 
the time? 
A. I can remember it was around 
4:00 or after. That's about it. It 
6 
would be shortly after. 
Q. And, what was your reason for 
coming in at that particular time? 
A. Well, I just told him I'd be 
there before 5:30 and I just figured it 
was close enough that they would have a 
pretty good idea what I'd be doing that 
night. I can't remember how far down 
the board I was. But, of course, like I 
say, I learned that it would be eaten up 
pretty fast sometimes, and I knew that 
it was important that I keep in touch. 
Q. Were you in the vicinity at 
the time and feeling you'd just drop in? 
A. Well, it depends on what you'd 
call "vicinity." I was down there on 13th 




I just figured it would be a 
to, that I should either call or, 
either go back there. 
Q. Was it your feeling that they 
anticipated your reporting sometime around 
the time that you came in? 
A. Yes. Well, yes. I knew that 
they'd be calling me if I didn't let them 
know where I was. 
Q. Mr. Wilkinson, what was the sole 
purpose of your being at Garrett's between 
4:00 and 4:30 on September 7, 1967? 
A. My sole purpose was to let them 
know that I was available to go to work and 
to find out exactly how much time I had, free 
time, before I had to go to work. 
Record at 56-57, 60, 63-64. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTE 
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED. 
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated 
(Repl. vol. 1966), states: 
Every employee . • • who is injured 
. . • by accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment, -
wheresoever such injury occurred, 
provided the same was not purposely 
self-inflicted, shall be entitled 
to receive, and shall be paid, such 
compensation for loss sustained on 
account of such injury or death, and 
such amount for medical, nurse and 
hospital services and medicines, and, 
in case of death, such amount of 
funeral expenses, as is herein pro-
vided. (Emphasis added.) 
The terms "arising out of" and ''in the course 
of" are not synonymous. "IT]he words 'arising out 
of' are construed to refer to the origin or cause of 
the injury, and the words 'in the course of' refer 
to the time, place, and circumstances under which 
it occurred." Utah Apex Mining Company v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 67 Utah 537, 545, 248 P. 490, 493 (1926). 
will exist; nevertheless, "many accidents may occur 
8 
in the course of employment which do not arise 
out of it." Id. Thus, an injury will not "arise 
out of employment" unless the employee was injured 
when doing the specific job for which he was hired· 
' 
but the same injury could be "in the course of 
employment" if, for instance, the employee was 
attempting to leave the premises of his employer 
after his duties of employment had ended. See id. 
at 551, 248 P. at 495. See also Vitagraph, Inc. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 96 Utah 190, 194, 85 P.2d 601, 
607 (1938). 
Unlike most jurisdictions, the Utah statute 
allows compensation "when the accident arises in 
the course of employment, whether it arises out of 
employment or not." Id. at 545, 248 P. at 492. The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
[T]he Legislature amended that feature 
of the Act by substituting the word "or" 
for the word "and" thereby providing for 
compensation whenever either condition 
was established. No doubt after two 
years' experience in operating the Act 
the Legislature arrived at the conclu-
sion that to employes and their 
dependents demanded a more liberal pro-
vision than was afforded by the statute 
in 1917. In any event, the Legislature 
9 
recognized that there was a substan-
tial difference between the terms 
" .. t f" d"" arising ou o an in the course of" 
and amended the statute accordingly. 
It is the duty of the court to give 
due effect to the evident purpose of 
the amendment. 
id. at 550-51, 248 P, at 494-95. The statute was 
also amended in 1919 by adding the words "wheresoever 
such injury occurred." See g. at 553, 248 p. at 
495. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court has con-
tinually construed the Work.men's Compensation Act 
liberally to protect a claimant upon any legitimate 
claim. Vause v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 
217, 407 P.2d 1006 (1965); Chandler v. Industrial 
Conun'n, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020 (1919). 
II. PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY AN ACCIDENT THAT 
OCCURRED IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 
A. In Utah, Injuries Occurring at the 
Entrance of Employer's Premises are 
Compensable. 
Plaintiff contends that it was contemplated 
as a part of his employment that he report to make 
himself available for his employer's call. It was 
accepted practice to report personally or 
by telephone. His actions in thus reporting were 
beneficial to his employer. By reason of his 
10 
employment and the rL·.:·.·,1 : 1- , .... t , • < . ·- •• L 0 D available 
for call, plaintiff \.. 1.; to the hazardous 
and dangerous highi.;.iy it ion:; surrounding the 
entrance to his :• i'l of business to a 
degree greater than ti1t· public. The 
hazards peculiar to this L'ntr;rnce thus became the 
hazards of plaintiff's and there exists 
a direct causal rebtionship bct\,·een the accident 
and the employment. Consequently, the injury 
occasioned when plainti[f was attempting to egress 
from his employer's place of business was a.n injury 
"arising out of or in the course of employment" 
within the meaning of the Utah Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45 
(Repl. vol. 1966), and plaintiff is entitled to 
compensation under that Act. 
In Utah it appears definitely settled that 
if an employee is injured in the normal course of 
things, in going to or from his work or place of 
employment, his iniurv is the result of normal 
hazards that everyone encounters and is therefore 
not in the course of employment. Vitagraph, Inc. 
11 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Utah 190, 194, 85 P.2d 
601, 607 (1938); Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 72 Utah 199, 269 P. 512 (1928). Never---· 
theless, there is at least one exception to this 
rule, recognized by the Utah courts, which allows 
recovery for injuries received away from the em-
ployer's plant or the employee's work sites. 
It is well settled in Utah that if an em-
ployee, by reason of his employment, is exposed to a 
peril at the entranceway to his employer's premises 
which is common to all, but by virtue of his employ-
ment is peculiarly and abnormally exposed to this 
common peril, the exposure becomes an incident to 
the employment and sustains the causal relationship 
between employment and the accident. In Cudahy 
Packing Company v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 161, 
207 P. 148 (1922), aff'd, Cudahy Packing Company 
v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153 (1923), 
an employee was killed when the car in which he 
was riding was struck by a train at a crossing on 
a county road leading to his employer's plant. The 
road was the only means of access to the plant, and 
12 
it was necessary for the employees going to work 
to pass over these railroad tracks on the public 
road where the accident happened. At the time the 
accident occurred, the deceased was not on the pre-
mises of the plaintiff, and was not engaged in any 
actual work connected with his employment. The 
train which collided with the deceased's automobile 
was in no way under control of the employer, nor was 
it engaged in any work for or in behalf of the em-
ployer. The employer did not control nor in any 
i.1ay attempt to control the method or manner of travel 
to or from work by its employees. The court held 
that the dependents of the deceased could recover 
under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act because the 
danger incident to crossing the railroad track, by 
reason of its location and proximity to the employ-
er's plant, must have been within the contemplation 
of the parties at the date of employment and that 
the accident would, therefore, arise both out of 
and occur in the course of employment. The court 
noted iSi9 amendment to the Act which substi-
tuted the word "or" for the word "and" in the phrase 
13 
''arising out of or in the course of employment" 
and upheld the phrase "wheresoever such injury has 
occurred" against any constitutional attack. 
The United States Supreme Court in affirming 
the Utah decision stated: 
[I]t is enough if there be a 
causal connection between the injury 
and the business in which [the em-
ployer] employs the [claimant]--a 
connection substantially contributory 
though it need not be the sole proxi-
mate cause. 
The fact that the accident hap-
pens upon a public road or at a rail-
road crossing and that the danger is 
one to which the general public is 
likewise exposed, is not conclusive 
against the existence of such causal 
relationship, if the danger be one to 
which the employee, by reason of and 
in connection with his employment, is 
subjected peculiarly or to an abnormal 
degree. 
263 U.S. at 423-24, 44 S.Ct. at 154. The decision 
of the Utah court was also attacked because the 
accident occurred a few minutes before work was to 
begin. The Court indicated that "the employment 
contemplated [the employee's] entry upon and de-
parture from the premises as much as it contemplated 
his working there, and must include a reasonable 
14 
l'nterval of time for that purpose." 263 u s . . at 
426, 44 S.Ct. at 155. 
In the subsequent case of Bountiful Brick Com-
v. Industrial Comm'n, 68 Utah 600, 251 P. 555 
(1926), aff'd, Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 
276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221 (1928), the Cudahy case, 
supra, was relied on in granting recovery under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act to the dependents of a 
deceased who was struck and killed by a train while 
he was crossing a railroad track adjacent to the 
place of the employer's business. The court allowed 
recovery although there was a safer route to the 
plant approximately one-half mile greater in distance. 
The court held that a reasonable person would not 
expect the employee to have used the longer route 
and that the shorter route was a fair and necessary 
means for proceeding to or coming from his work. 
The court stated: 
The employee, in crossing the 
track at any time, was exposed to a 
peril which is common to all, but by 
virtue ot his employment ne was re-
quired to cross the track regularly 
and continuously, thus being peculiarly 
and abnormally exposed to a common peril. 
15 
It is the greater degree of exposure 
to the peril which arises as an inci-
dent to the employment which sustains 
the causal relation between the em-
ployment and the accident. 
68 Utah at 604, 251 P. at 556. 
The rule in the Cudahy case, supra, has been 
extended to include compensation for injuries re-
ceived on a public highway when the peculiar risks 
of a railroad crossing were not present. In Park 
Utah Consolidated Mines Company v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 103 Utah 64, 133 P.2d 314 (1943), the in-
jured employee was leaving work on foot when he 
slipped and broke his ankle on a public highway ap-
proximately four feet removed from the premises of 
the employer. The court stated: 
We believe the decision of this 
case must be controlled by the case of 
Cudahy Packing Company v. Industrial 
Comm'n, supra. We do not think the 
principle upon which the case was ruled 
justifies limiting the hazard to a rail-
road crossing or a right-of-way adja-
cent to the premises of the employer. 
The facts of this case come within the 
exception to the rule that there can be 
no Workmen's Compensation for an acci-
dent going to or iLuill wock. 
The general rule is precicated upon the 
fact that the employee selects the par-
ticular way, means, and conveyance for 
16 
going to and from work. When the 
employee arrives at the threshhold 
of his employment and the means for 
entrance are limited so that he has 
no choice as to the mode of entrance ' all of the hazards which are peculiar 
to such entrance attach to his em-
ployment. The converse is equally 
true as to leaving the employment. 
103 Utah at 71, 133 P.2d at 317 (emphasis added). 
Also, the court reiterated the fact that Utah has a 
more liberal rule regarding employment compensation 
than most states and that the results reached in 
decisions of other states are distinguishable. 
Consequently, the foregoing cases establish 
the principle that an employee may recover for injur-
ies sustained at the entrance to the employer's pre-
mises when the use of such entrance is contemplated 
from the employee's employment and when the use of 
the entrance constitutes a hazard to which the em-
ployee by reason of his employmeuL is subjected to 
a degree greater than the general public. It ap-
pears to be immaterial that the deceased was not 
on the premises of the employer at the time of 
the was not engaged in any actual work 
connected with his employment, and was in no way 
17 
injured through an instrumentality under the control 
of the employer. 
B. Utah's Case Law is in Harmony with 
Other Jurisdictions. 
Authorities in other jurisdictions likewise 
support the plaintiff's recovery in this case. In 1 
Larsen, Workmen's Compensation, Section 15.13, at 
199-202 (1966), it is stated: 
The commonest ground of extension 
[extension of the rule limiting recovery 
for travel to and from work to the actual 
premises of the employer] is that the 
off-premises point at which the injury 
occurred lies on the only route, or at 
least on the normal route, which employees 
must traverse to reach the plant, and 
that therefore the special hazards of that 
route become the hazards of the employ-
ment. This general idea seems to have been 
accepted by the majority of jurisdictions 
in some degree. 
According to Larsen, the underlying theory for the 
above exception is not respondeat superior, since in 
these cases there is no control over the employee 
by the employer, no wages are usually being paid at 
the time of the accident, and the interests of the 
ernp:i.uyer art::! uu L usually being auvd.11\...t!U. ··-... .LL .Lb 
simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that 
18 
there is a causal connection between the conditions 
under wl1ich claimant must approach and leave the 
premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may 
hold that the course of employment extends as far as 
those conditions extend." Id. at 211. The majority 
ruled thus recited by Larsen exists even though the 
majority of jurisdictions have a statute dissimilar 
with Utah's inasmuch as most jurisdictions require 
that the injury arise out of and be in the course 
of the employment. 
For instance, in Greydanus v. Industrial Ac-
cident Commission, 47 Cal. Rpt. 384, 407 P.2d 296 
(1965), the California Supreme Court under such a 
statute upheld an employee's claim for injuries 
sustained when he was making a left-hand turn into 
his employer's premises from a public highway. The 
court affirmed the Commission's finding that the ap-
plicant had entered the necessary means of access 
to the employer's premises and, thus, had come with-
in the field of special risk created by the employ-
ment. The court cited with Indemnity 
19 
v. Industrial Accident Commission, 28 Cal.2d 
329, 170 P.2d 18 (1946). In that case the claimant 
was making a left turn into the place of business 
of his employer and was hit by another car. The 
front wheels came to rest on the parking lot of 
the employer. The court held that the accident arose 
out of and in the course of employment and that it 
was immaterial that the accident occurred some three-
and-a-half blocks from the claimant's actual place 
of employment on the employer's plant, that the ac-
cident occurred some minutes before work was to be-
gin, and that the accident occurred on a public high-
way. Nor was the fact that the entrance was not the 
only one detrimental to the claimant's cause. The 
court stated: 
In compensation law the general 
rule is well established that injuries 
received by an employee while going to 
or coming from his place of work are 
not compensible . . . However, in ap-
plying this general rule to border-line 
cases, the term "employment" has been 
held to include "not only the doing of 
the work, but a reasonable margin of 
time and space necessary to be used in 
passing to and from the place where work 
20 
is to be done." In further 
clarification of the general rule, 
it has been held that injuries sus-
tained by an employee while going to 
or from his place of work upon pre-
mises owned or controlled by his em-
ployer are generally deemed to have 
arisen out of and in the course of 
employment .... Also, it is well 
settled that if the employment creates 
a special risk, an employee is en-
titled to compensation for injuries 
sustained within that field of risk. 
The employee may be subject to such 
risk as soon as he enters the em-
ployer's premises or the necessary 
means of access thereto, even when 
the latter is not under employer's 
control or management. 
228 Cal.2d at 335-36, 170 P.2d at 22-23. 
Similarly, in Freire v. Matson Navigation 
Company, 21 Cal.2d 751, 118 P.2d 809 (1941), the 
California Supreme Court affirmed compensation for 
a janitor who worked upon a steam ship. He reported 
to work where the ship was moored every day at 8:00. 
One morning, he took a taxi to work and as he was 
getting out of the taxi he was struck by an auto-
mobile driven by one of the employees and owned by 
the employer. The court held that the accident 
occurred within the scope of employment. It made no 
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riif ference to the court that the accident occurred 
on a public road since the danger was one to which 
the employee, by reason of and in connection with 
his employment, was subjected peculiarly or to an 
abnormal degree. 
Other courts have likewise extended the 
rule, have adopted the Utah rule and have expanded 
it to include dangers which are peculiar to public 
highways. In Montgomery v. State Industrial Acci-
dent Commission, 224 Ore. 380, 356 P.2d 524 (1960), 
the employee was granted recovery resulting from 
an accident when he was struck by an automobile as 
he undertook to cross the thorough-fare in front of 
the employer's premises. The court adopted the 
Utah rule expressed in the Cudahy case and in the 
Bountiful Brick case and stated: 
The essential facts in the 
Parramore case are not materially 
different from those of the case 
at bar. In the Parramore case 
/Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 
263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153 (1923), 
aff'g, Cudahy Packing Co. v. In-
Cuuuu..:.bt>.ion, OG u ..... lGl, 
22 
207 P. 148 (1922)/, as in this 
one the accident occurred upon 
a public thorough-fare in front 
of the plant where the men worked. 
It is true that in the Parramore 
case the source of danger was the 
trains which operated across the 
road which the workmen were required 
to travel upon in going to and from 
the place of their employment. In 
the case at bar the source of dan-
ger was the vehicles which ran up 
and down the street the plaintiff 
was required to cross. The trains 
in the Parramore case ran upon a 
fixed rail, but motor vehicles in 
their movement are not restrained 
by rails. We do not believe that 
it would be reasonable to rule that, 
although a railroad train is a source 
of hazard to those who must cross 
its tracks, a motor truck, although 
it not infrequently runs in a squa-
dron-like formation with other vehi-
cles, is not a source of hazard. 
356 P.2d at 530. 
For other cases allowing recovery for in-
juries received entering or leaving the premises of 
the employer see Barnett v. Brittling Cafeteria 
Company, 225 Ala. 462, 143 So. 813 (1932); State 
Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accident 
Commission, 192 Cal. 28, 227 P. 168 (1924); Chandler 
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General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Corpor 
Jtion, 10 Ga. App. 597, 114 S.E.2d 438 (1960)· - , 
DeHovos v. Industrial Commission, 26 Ill.2d 110, 
185 N.E.2d 885 (1962); Mcfield v. Lincoln Hotel, 35 
111. App.2d 340, 182 N.E.2d 905 (1962); Nelson v. 
City of St. Paul, 249 Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272 (1957); 
Nevada Industrial Commission v. Leonard, SO Nev. 16, 
68 P.2d 576 (1937). Cf. Seabreeze Industries, Inc. 
v. Phily, 118 So.2d 54 (Dis.Ct.App.Fla. 1960). 
C. Plaintiff's Injury was Causally 
Related to his Employment. 
In the instant case, there exists a sufficient 
causal relation between plaintiff's employment and 
his presence at the entranceway of his employer's 
premises to bring into play the "hazardous entrance-
way" line of cases mentioned above, even though 
plaintiff was not actually leaving the premises 
directly after he had completed his driving duties. 
While it is true that the "hazardous entranceway" 
line of cases involved employees coming to and 
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employees have definite hours, are not expected to 
report periodically, and generally use the entrance 
to their employer's premises only when they are 
going to or leaving work. The peculiar fact situa-
tion surrounding the terms of employment in this 
case has not been presented to this Court before 
' 
but the record in this case substantiates the fact 
that plaintiff's presence at the employer's entrance-
way was encouraged and in fact, contemplated in his 
employment duties. 
First, it is established that the drivers 
at Garrett Freightlines who are on the extra board 
are subject to a twenty-four-hour call. Record at 
12-13, 46, 51; 7 of defendant's 
Exhibit 3. Second, the record indicates that if 
a driver on the extra board is not available when 
he receives an alert call from Garrett's, he is 
dropped to the bottom of the extra board list, 
foregoes employment until his name again reaches 
the top of the list, and is subject to disciplinary 
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action from the company. Record at 16-17, 55, 79-
80, 113-14. Third, both Mr. Stoddard, a driver 
for defendant who has served on the extra board, 
and the plaintiff testified that in order to avoid 
the consequences of not being available when Gar-
rett Freightlines called, they periodically kept 
in touch with Garrett Freightlines to determine 
their probable departure time. Record at 12-13, 
16-17, 52-53. Fourth, according to the witnesses 
for the plaintiff and for Garrett, it was standard 
procedure at Garrett Freightlines to expect these 
periodic reports or calls from the men on the 
extra board in order that they could determine their 
probable departure time and thereby make themselves 
available for call. Record at 12-13, 17, 43, 52-
53. Although it was usual procedure for the drivers 
on the extra board to telephone Garrett's to deter-
mine their status on the board, Record at 120, both 
the plaintiff's witnesses and witnesses for Garrett 
testified that Garrett had no objection to the dri-
7ers coming in personally to find out that information; 
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this practice was never discouraged. Record at 
15, 52-53, 54, 110, 113-14, 120. In fact, Mr. 
Christensen, manager of Garrett's terminal, indi-
cated that during the week of the hearing, drivers 
had reported in personally to check on their posi-
tion on the board. Record at 112. Fifth, the dri-
vers at Garrett could expect a call to work at any-
time, including when they called in to make them-
selves available. Record at 19, 55-56, 76-77. 
Sixth, Garrett discouraged telephone calls by the 
extra board drivers between the hours of 4:00 p.m. 
and 6:00 p.m. Record at 18. Therefore, if drivers 
were in the vicinity of Garrett's during those hours, 
they would appear in person in order to comply with 
Garrett's policy of not calling in during those 
hours, and yet still making themselves available for 
work. This would be true especially if, like plain-
tiff, a driver was living alone and would be away 
from his telephone during the normal calling hours. 
See record at 52-54. Seventh, although the extra 
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board sheet indicated that plaintiff would report 
in at 5:30 p.m., it was contrary to the labor con-
tract between Garrett and the Teamster's Union to 
retain a man's position on the extra board if an 
assignment to drive came up before any indicated 
time of reporting. Record at 110-12. Also, plain-
tiff had been passed over once before by Garrett 
and had been dropped to the bottom of the extra 
board rotation list because he could not be reached 
for an assignment which came up before his indicated 
check-in time. Record at 55. Therefore, plaintiff 
was justified from his past experience with Garrett 
and because of the Union contract to report prior 
to the 5:30 p.m. hour. 
Consequently, plaintiff's presence at Garrett's 
entranceway at the time of his accident was suffi-
ciently employment related to bring him within the 
exception to the "going and coming" rule. An acci-
dent arises in the course of employment "if it oc-
curs while the employee is rendering service to his 
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employer which he was hired to do or doing some-
thing incidental thereto, at the time when and 
the place where he was authorized to render such 
service." M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 
Utah 488, 493, 189 P.2d 132 (1948). An employee 
can recover under workmen's compensation if he is 
engaged in some employment-related activity. The 
Utah court has stated: 
On the other hand, in order for 
an employee to be covered by workmen's 
compensation, it is not necessary that 
he be doing the particular task which 
constitutes his main duties, but there 
are many employment-related activities 
which employees are expected to parti-
cipate in and in which they are covered. 
The essential thing is that there be some 
substantial rel&tionship between the 
activity engaged in and the carrying on 
of the employer's business. 
Askren v. Industrial Com..m'n, 15 Utah 2d 275, 277, 
391 P.2d 302, 304 (1964). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing authorities and argu-
ment, plaintiff respectfully submits the Order of 
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the Industrial Corrunission of Utah dated May 22, 
1969, is contrary to law and that said Commission 
should be ordered and directed by this Court to 
award plaintiff compensation as provided for by 
the Industrial Act of the State of Utah. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
Roger H. Thompson 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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